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THE GLOBAL COST OF GREEN: RECENT TRADE ISSUES
AND LITIGATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
CHINA MAY DISSOLVE GLOBAL GREEN COOPERATION
DAVID P. VINCENT*
INTRODUCTION
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the National People’s Congress
adopted a collection of environmental laws, which attempted to reduce
pollution while protecting the natural environment.1 Additionally, China’s
government enacted more than one hundred national laws and regula-
tions aimed at environmental protection during this period.2 Despite the
legislative actions, by 2006 China had surpassed the United States as
the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases.3 That same year, the
Renewable Energy Law of the People’s Republic of China took effect, and
the Chinese government implemented one of the largest state-sponsored
commitments toward renewable energy, imposing a national renewable
energy requirement that is expected to boost the use of renewable energy
capacity up to 10 percent by the year 2020.4
China’s growing support for renewables and green technology has
sparked a growing number of trade concerns abroad. A group of U.S. solar
companies vocalized their concerns in late 2011 by filing a petition with
the United States International Trade Commission (“USITC”) and the
United States Department of Commerce (“Commerce”), claiming that the
Chinese government’s support for renewables (specifically solar panels)
actually consists of unfair subsidies.5 In addition, growing animosity in
the European Union (“EU”) toward Chinese solar panel manufacturing
* J.D., University of San Diego School of Law, 2012; B.A., University of California, San
Diego, 2009.
1 Robert V. Percival, China’s “Green Leap Forward” Toward Global Environmental
Leadership, 12 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 633, 639 (2011).
2 Id. at 639–40.
3 Id. at 634.
4 Joel B. Eisen, China’s Greentech Programs and the USTR Investigation, 11 SUSTAINABLE
DEV. L. & POL’Y 3, 3 (2011) [hereinafter Eisen, China’s Greentech Programs].
5 INT’L TRADE ADMIN., COMMERCE PRELIMINARY FINDS DUMPING OF CRYSTALLINE SILICON
PHOTOVOLTAIC CELLS, WHETHER OR NOT ASSEMBLED INTO MODULES FROM THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2012) [hereinafter PETITION], available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download
/factsheets/factsheet-prc-solar-cells-ad-prelim20120517.pdf.
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and subsidies may very well spur a similar investigation with the Euro-
pean Commission.
As a result of the recent investigations and actions aimed directly
at China, the Chinese government has criticized the United States as being
overly protectionist and possibly behaving in direct violation of World
Trade Organization (“WTO”) rules.6 After recent court decisions involving
trade between the United States and China, paired with a new American
law, China’s assertions may be correct.
This Article begins by looking at how China has moved forward
in embracing green technology development, the government’s role in
that growth and whether its support is truly harmful on a global scale.
It highlights key laws in the United States and the WTO involving trade—
specifically subsidies, countervailing duties and anti-dumping regulations.
An examination of recent trade cases involving the United States and
China is followed by an analysis of America’s recent trade-oriented actions
and legislation. Lastly, this Article will consider the legal implications of
recent trade developments between these countries as well as policy im-
plications, including the effect on the green and renewables industry.
I. CHINA’S AMBITIOUS GREEN TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
Although the Chinese government’s attitude toward climate change
and the environment has shifted in the past few years, China still ranks
as one of the most polluting countries in the world.7 China’s environmental
problems are severe,8 as it still struggles with poor air and water quality9
and growing greenhouse gas emissions.10
6 Robert Plummer, Protectionism: Is It on the Way Back?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 17, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-18104024, archived at http://perma.cc/XC8E-V2LU.
7 JOHN W. EMERSON ET AL., 2012 ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE INDEX AND PILOT TREND
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE INDEX: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 4, 6 (Yale Ctr. for
Envtl. Law & Policy ed., 2012), available at http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/downloads
/data/epi/epi-environmental-performance-index-pilot-trend-2012/summary-for
-policymakers.pdf (ranking China 116 out of 132 for overall environmental performance).
8 Joel B. Eisen, China’s Renewable Energy Law: A Platform for Green Leadership?, 35
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 7 (2010) [hereinafter Eisen, China’s Renewable
Energy Law]; see generally Christina Larson, The Great Paradox of China: Green Energy
and Black Skies, YALE ENV’T 360 (Aug. 17, 2009), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/the_great
_paradox_of_china_green_energy_and_black_skies/2180/, archived at http://perma.cc
/FY4N-9CCH.
9 Larson, supra note 8.
10 See JOHN W. EMERSON ET AL., 2012 ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE INDEX AND PILOT 
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China’s electric power sector contributes a large portion of the
nation’s greenhouse gas emissions, with over 70% of China’s electricity
still generated from coal.11 China’s coal production has more than doubled
since 2000.12 However, with the nation’s energy consumption expected to
nearly triple by 2035, China has set its ambitions to greatly increase the
share of electricity generated from non-fossil fuel sources.13
China’s national government has made a commitment to renewable
energy.14 As a basis of its policy intended to combat its current environ-
mental state, China is making extensive investments in solar and wind
power technology.15 For example, installed renewable electricity capacity
(not including hydro) was all but non-existent just a few years ago, but
has since doubled every year starting in 2005.16 As part of its movement
toward becoming more environmentally conscious, China has also become
the home for a growing green technology industry. In less than five years,
China became a major player in the global market for wind turbines and
now Chinese companies have grown to play a dominant role in the manu-
facture of solar technology as well.17 China is now a world leader for solar
photovoltaic (“PV”) cells and modules.18 In 2010, China and Taiwan ac-
counted for 53% of global PV shipments.19 In addition to its growth in
manufacturing, China ranks in the top five PV markets, growing four
hundred and seventy percent year over year (“Y/Y”) in 2011.20 Chinese
manufacturers make about fifty million solar panels a year and include
four of the top five solar-panel manufacturers in the world.21 China’s
TREND ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE INDEX: FULL REPORT 56 (Yale Ctr. for Envtl. Law
& Policy ed., 2012), available at http://epi.yale.edu/files/2012_epi_report.pdf.
11 Kat Cheung, Integration of Renewables: Status and Challenges in China 7 (Int’l Energy
Agency, Working Paper, 2011), available at http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications
/publication/integration_of_renewables.pdf.
12 China, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 29 (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysis
briefs/China/china.pdf.
13 Cheung, supra note 11.
14 Eisen, China’s Renewable Energy Law, supra note 8, at 10.
15 Id. at 1.
16 Cheung, supra note 11.
17 Eisen, China’s Greentech Problems, supra note 4, at 4.
18 Id.
19 U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, SUNSHOT VISION STUDY 26 (Robert Margolis et al. eds., 2012),
available at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/solar/pdfs/47927.pdf.
20 World Solar Photovoltaic Market Grew to 27.4 Gigawatts in 2011, Up 40% Y/Y, NPD
SOLARBUZZ (Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.solarbuzz.com/news/recent-findings/world-solar
-photovoltaic-market-grew-274-gigawatts-2011-40-yy-0, archived at http://perma.cc/EDL9
-6NAV.
21 Kevin Bullis, The Chinese Solar Machine, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www
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twelfth Five-Year Plan approved in March of 2011, also illustrates the
change in the country, calling for uncompromising environmental and en-
ergy initiatives.22 The plan seeks to dramatically change China’s energy
portfolio by building 235 gigawatts of power generation capacity from clean
energy sources, including a goal of 40 new gigawatts of nuclear capacity
and 5 gigawatts of solar power capacity by 2015.23
II. CHINA’S POLICIES AND GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES MAY BE HARMFUL
China’s now established dedication to renewable energy embraces
significant “governmental laws, policies and incentives to promote renew-
ables.”24 China’s procedure for developing and implementing these laws,
however, is different than those of countries such as the United States,
where state or local governments have large roles. China is a one-party
state with centralized power in the national government.25 China has an
economic system different from the United States; a “non-market economy
with a top-down, command-and-control energy planning process that is
often nontransparent.”26 Due to the construction of China’s economy, it
is difficult to discern whether the country is following international trade
rules or not.27
“[S]tate-owned energy companies in China also” have “consider-
able power in decision-making.”28 China’s electricity utility sector was
made up of one state-owned monopoly until 2002, when the State Council
Electricity Reform Plan broke the monopoly into two grid companies and
five generating companies.29 The five generating companies are still con-
trolled by the state, as is one of the grid companies.30 At a more local level,
.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/426393/the-chinese-solar-machine, archived at http://
perma.cc/Q9CQ-DG55.
22 Percival, supra note 1, at 649–50.
23 Id. at 650–51.
24 Eisen, China’s Renewable Energy Law, supra note 8, at 16.
25 Id. at 16–17.
26 Melanie Hart, What Does the Solar Trade Dispute Mean? Shining a Light on U.S.-China
Clean Energy Cooperation, THINK PROGRESS (Feb. 9, 2012), http://thinkprogress.org/romm
/2012/02/09/422282/solar-%20trade-us-china-clean-energy-cooperation/?mobile=nc, archived
at http://perma.cc/36NG-DWTK.
27 Id.
28 Eisen, China’s Renewable Energy Law, supra note 8, at 21.
29 Id.
30 Chun Chun Ni, INST. ENERGY ECON., JAPAN, China’s Electric Power Industry and Its
Trends 19–20 (Apr. 2006), http://eneken.ieej.or.jp/en/data/pdf/326.pdf.
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some provincial governments have initiated “policies under the central
government’s legal framework” to also promote renewables.31
China’s twelfth Five-Year Plan clearly illustrates the country’s
economic policy relating to green energy.32 China’s Ministry of Industry
and Information Technology announced, in February of 2012, its goal of re-
ducing the cost of solar power to 0.8 yuan (or 12 U.S. cents) per kilowatt-
hour by 2015 and 0.6 yuan (9 U.S. cents) by 2020.33 These targets are
meant to reduce the cost of domestic solar power and continue the expan-
sion of the domestic market for the photovoltaic industry.34 The plan also
requires China’s top polysilicon manufacturers to achieve annual produc-
tion capacities of 50,000 tons by 2015, with solar panel makers required
to reach 5 gigawatts of annual production capacity also by 2015.35
China has numerous policies which are in place to encourage in-
novation of other clean energy technologies including solar, and in fact,
green energy is one of the “seven strategic industries” that Beijing sup-
ports with state funds and various other preferential policies, such as by
issuing tax breaks.36 Because Beijing makes clean energy development
a priority, governments at the provincial and local levels “have a strong
incentive to develop their own support policies.”37 Some local governments
have turned their provinces into clean manufacturing centers by going
above and beyond the national policy requirements, while other areas have
chosen to adopt the national directives from the Ministry of Finance,
which call upon “local financial bureaus to raise” and dispense “green
energy development funds.”38 Some local governments view clean energy
as an excellent opportunity for provincial growth.39 One example of these
practices can be found in Jiangsu Province. In 2009, Jiangsu created a
three-year solar PV development plan, which requested that “local of-
ficials cultivate name-brand products and internationally competitive
31 Eisen, China’s Renewable Energy Law, supra note 8, at 22.
32 See generally Percival, supra note 1, at 649 (discussing the role of energy in Chinese
economic policy).
33 Du Juan, China’s Domestic Solar Market to Expand, PEOPLE’S CHINA DAILY ONLINE
(Feb. 26, 2012), http://english.people.com.cn/90778/7740243.html, archived at http://perma
.cc/5JU9-E78G.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Hart, supra note 26.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
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enterprises by providing state assistance for product development and
supply-chain verticalization.”40 This province manufactured two-thirds
of China’s total solar PV equipment in 2010 and around ninety percent
of that equipment was exported to foreign markets.41
China’s welcome of green energy technology occurred so quickly
and on such a large scale that this shift even brought about a complaint by
the United Steelworkers of America (“USW”), which was then accepted
by the United States government in October 2010.42 USW claimed that
China was engaging in protectionist and predatory practices in the fol-
lowing areas: 1) restrictions on access to important materials; 2) perfor-
mance requirements for investors; 3) discrimination against both foreign
firms and goods; 4) prohibition of export subsidies and domestic content
subsidies; and 5) domestic subsidies which distorted trade.43 In that case,
the United States challenged the Special Fund for Wind Power Equipment
Manufacturing subsidies at the WTO after completing an investigation.44
Here the subsidies were actual “grants to Chinese wind turbine manufac-
turers [who] agreed to use . . . parts . . . made in China rather than [using]
imports.”45 As a result, China formally revoked the legal measure that
created this subsidy program, making this the third successful challenge
for the United States at the WTO against Chinese government subsidies.46
As a member of the WTO, China is required to submit information
about all of its subsidies regularly; however, China never notified the WTO
about the wind power subsidy.47 In actuality, as of June 2011, “China
ha[d] submitted only one subsidies notification since becoming [a] [m]em-
ber in . . . 2001.”48
40 Id. (footnote omitted).
41 Id.
42 Percival, supra note 1, at 646.
43 Press Release, United Steelworkers, United Steelworkers’ Section 301 Petition Demon-
strates China’s Green Technology Practices Violate WTO Rules (on file with author),
available at http://assets.usw.org/releases/misc/section-301.pdf.
44 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., China Ends Wind Power Equip. Subsidies
Challenged by the U.S. in WTO Dispute (June, 2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov
/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/june/china-ends-wind-power-equipment-subsidies
-challenged, archived at http://perma.cc/Y7JR-JR96.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.; Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 25, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 1869 U.N.T.S.
14, 255, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf [hereinafter
Agreement].
48 Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 44.
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III. THE UNITED STATES/CHINA TRADE CASE
A. U.S. Solar Market
The solar market in the United States has grown rapidly over the
past few years due to falling prices and its own government subsidies.49
However, more recent expiration of key government subsidies and expan-
sion of the natural gas market have caused uncertainty in the market-
place.50 As a result of recent trade issues with China, solar companies have
changed their contracts to purchase solar panels and cells from other
countries besides China.51 But while solar manufacturers are feeling the
most pain, these lower prices and government subsidies have led to a boom
in solar power development and investment.52
In 2011, the U.S. solar energy industry installed 1,855 megawatts
(“MW”) of photovoltaic capacity, which is more than double the record of
887 MW in 2010.53 The American share of the global solar PV market
also grew quite a bit in 2011, from 5% to 7%, and is predicted to continue
growing.54 The U.S. solar market growth is owed to a few different causes.
First, the government’s 1603 Treasury Program, which provides additional
liquidity in the marketplace by allowing solar project developers to more
easily monetize existing tax incentives, ended December 31, 2011, caus-
ing many developers to commission projects before the end of the year.55
Second, a shift toward large systems nationwide improved installation
efficiency and more financing options contributed to the growth. Third,
and maybe most importantly, the huge drop in solar panel prices contrib-
uted greatly to the boom in the solar industry.56
American solar manufacturing declined in 2011 for a few reasons,
namely global oversupply of panels and the declining prices of solar panels,
49 Cassandra Sweet, Solar-Panel Users Prepare for Tariffs on Chinese Imports, WALL ST.
J., (Mar. 19, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304724404577
291970158018242, archived at http://perma.cc/YV4J-7BMN.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Zachary Shahan, 2011 U.S. Solar Market Report—Top 7 Findings & Chart, CLEAN
TECHNICA (Mar. 15, 2012), http://cleantechnica.com/2012/03/15/us-solar-facts-charts/,
archived at http://perma.cc/N3P7-D6FB.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N & GTM RESEARCH, U.S. SOLAR MARKET INSIGHT REPORT:
2011 YEAR-IN-REVIEW: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, available at http://www.seia.org/sites/default
/files/resources/2011%20Q4%20SMI%20ES.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014) [hereinafter SEIA].
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solar cells and solar wafers in China.57 In 2011, for example, the United
States imported $3.1 billion worth of solar cells and panels from China.58
B. United States vs. China Silicon Solar PV Subsidies
Solar energy subsidies in the United States mostly “focus[ ] on
stimulating demand for solar energy systems” by “provid[ing] incentives
for ‘consumers’ to invest” in purchasing the systems and “having them
installed.”59 These types of subsidies do not give domestic manufacturers
an advantage; the origin of the solar panels does not factor into the subsidy
at all.60 On the other hand, China’s subsidies are mostly aimed at stimulat-
ing China’s domestic manufacturers and the production of silicon solar PV
cells and panels.61 Subsidizing the export of these panels appears to be
harming U.S. industry and businesses, which is expressly prohibited by
WTO rules and other member country legislation.62
There are arguments that China’s trade policies are not just harm-
ing the United States, but also clean energy exporters in many other
countries—particularly in Europe.63 Recent accusations stemming from
trade issues between the countries include statements that China’s lenient
labor, safety, health, and environmental standards, as well as generous
government subsidies, assist the country in driving down prices and es-
sentially price other manufacturers out of business.64 Lower-cost Chinese
manufacturing may play a substantial role in undercutting some American
and European manufacturers, leaving many manufacturers claiming that
the “China Price” is really due to Chinese government involvement, not
natural market forces.65
But government subsidies are not only a practice in China. The
United States also has supported the development of solar energy with
57 Id.
58 Zhang Yuwei, US Sets New Duties on Chinese Solar Imports, CHINA DAILY (Mar. 21,
2012), http://newamericamedia.org/2012/03/us-sets-new-duties-on-chinese-solar-imports
.php, archived at http://perma.cc/9AWH-DQ73.
59 Andrew, Dumping Solar: CASM’s Case Against Chinese Subsidies & Manufacturers
Part III, CLEANTECHNICA (Jan. 22, 2012), http://cleantechnica.com/2012/01/22/dumping
-solar-casms-case-against-chinese-subsidies-manufacturers-pt-iii/, archived at http://perma
.cc/G2KS-MT7Y.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Hart, supra note 26.
64 Id.
65 Id.
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financial incentives to companies and households.66 An important difference
is that China initially focused on developing large-scale manufacturing of
solar panels only for export, and only very recently did the government
begin to subsidize the installation of panels in China.67
C. Section 301 Petitions
Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 (the “Act”) is the primary
statutory authority under which the United States may bring about trade
sanctions on foreign countries that breach trade agreements or participate
in other unfair trade activities.68 The Act authorizes the President to take
all appropriate action, including retaliation, to achieve removal of any act,
policy, or practice of a foreign government that violates an international
trade agreement or is unjustified, unreasonable, or discriminatory and
burdens or restricts American commerce.69 This law does not require the
U.S. government to wait until it receives permission from the WTO in order
to move forward with enforcement actions.70 Cases under Section 301 may
be initiated by the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) on its
own or as the result of a petition filed by a company or industry.71 If the
USTR decides to move forward with an investigation, it must attempt to
negotiate a settlement with the foreign country and for cases involving
trade agreements, the USTR must request formal dispute proceedings as
outlined in the specific trade agreement.72
66 Keith Bradsher & Matthew L. Wald, A Measured Rebuttal to China Over Solar Panels,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2012, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/21
/business/energy-environment/us-to-place-tariffs-on-chinese-solar-panels
.html?pagewanted=all&module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar&_r=0, archived at
http://perma.cc/F9AR-URU5.
67 Id.
68 INT’L TRADE ADMIN., Section 301, http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/tradedisputes-enforce
ment/tg_ian_002100.asp (last visited Oct. 27, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/LKQ2
-58B4.
69 Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1) (2012).
70 Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, CYCLOPAEDIA, http://www.cyclopaedia.de/wiki
/Section_301_of_the_Trade_Act_of_1974 (last visited Oct. 27, 2014), archived at http://
perma.cc/A6F8-BYTT; see also 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1) (2012).
71 Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, supra note 70.
72 JASPER WOMACH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AGRICULTURE: A GLOSSARY OF TERMS,
PROGRAMS, AND LAWS, 2005 EDITION 233 (2005), available at http://www.cnie.org/NLE
/CRSreports/05jun/97-905.pdf.
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D. “Dumping” and Subsidy Allegations Under U.S. Law and
WTO Laws
1. U.S. Law
“Dumping” is a kind of predatory pricing, especially in international
trade.73 It occurs when manufactures export a product to another country
either below the price charged in the home market or in amounts that
cannot occur through normal market competition.74 “The United States
International Trade Commission (‘USITC’) and the U.S. Department of
Commerce (‘Commerce’) are responsible for conducting antidumping and
countervailing duty (subsidy) investigations under . . . Title VII of the
Tariff Act of 1930.”75 “Under this law, United States industries may peti-
tion the USITC and Commerce” for assistance regarding imported goods,
which are sold in the United States at less than fair market value, or
goods resulting from countervailable subsidies from foreign governments.76
Commerce decides whether the alleged dumping or subsidizing is truly
occurring, and if so, the amount of the subsidy or the margin of dumping.77
The USITC, on the other hand, determines whether the American industry
is seriously injured or threatened with serious injury from the imports.78
If both agencies answer their questions positively, then Commerce will
issue an anti-dumping duty order to offset the dumping or a countervailing
duty order to offset the subsidy.79
The United States Court of International Trade (“CIT”) hears “dis-
putes relating to determinations made by the United States International
Trade Commission and [Commerce’s] International Trade Administration
regarding anti-dumping and countervailing duties.”80
73 Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N,
http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2014), archived at http://perma
.cc/N2LY-PMQS.
74 Dumping Definition, BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.businessdictionary.com
/definition/dumping.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/54JZ
-2ATN.
75 Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations, supra note 73.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 United States Court of International Trade Jurisdiction, U.S. CT. INT’L TRADE, http://
hausmieten.potiori.com/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade.html (last visited
Oct. 27, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/3X57-B7A7.
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2. WTO Law
The World Trade Organization “allows governments to act against
dumping where there is” a real “injury to the competing domestic in-
dustry.”81 The government must “show that dumping is taking place, cal-
culate the extent of the dumping,” and show the resulting injury.82 The
WTO General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) (Article 6) and
the Anti-Dumping Agreement work together to allow countries to “act in
a way that would normally” violate “the GATT principles of binding a tariff
and not discriminating between trade partners.”83 The usual action taken
against dumping is “charging [an] extra import duty” on the product in
order to “bring its price closer to the ‘normal value’ or to remove the
injury to the domestic industry.”84 A country may “use the WTO’s dispute
settlement procedure to seek the withdrawal of the subsidy” “[o]r the
country can launch its own investigation and ultimately charge [an] extra
duty.”85 If the investigation results in a showing that dumping is taking
place, and the domestic industry is experiencing injury, the exporting com-
pany can raise its price to avoid an import duty.86
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures “disci-
plines the use of subsidies” and controls “actions countries can take to
[deal with] the effects of subsidies.”87 The agreement allows a country to
“use the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure to [obtain] withdrawal of the
subsidy or removal of [the subsidy’s] adverse effects.”88 As an alternative,
the country can initiate “its own investigation and . . . charge an extra duty
(‘countervailing duty’) on subsidized imports that are . . . hurting domestic
producers.”89 “The agreement defines two [types] of subsidies: prohibited
and actionable.”90 Prohibited subsidies compel “recipients to meet certain
81 Understanding the WTO: The Agreements—Anti-Dumping Actions, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2014)
[hereinafter Anti-Dumping Actions], archived at http://perma.cc/F5VE-5H72.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Understanding the WTO: The Agreements—Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm
(last visited Oct. 27, 2014) [hereinafter Subsidies and Countervailing Measures], archived
at http://perma.cc/MQU9-2NJC.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
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export targets or to use domestic goods rather than imported goods”; “they
are prohibited because they are [meant] to distort international trade.”91
These types of subsidies may “be challenged in the WTO dispute settlement
procedure” and if confirmed to exist, “must be withdrawn immediately” or
the harmed “country can take counter measures.”92 On the other hand, an
actionable subsidy requires a “complaining country . . . to show that the
subsidy has an adverse effect on its interest”; otherwise, the subsidy is
allowed to continue.93 If the WTO Dispute Settlement Body finds that an
actionable subsidy does have a harmful effect, the subsidy must be elimi-
nated or its effects removed.94 Similar to prohibited subsidies, if domestic
producers are harmed, countervailing duties are permitted.95
E. Necessary Showing of Harm
Under the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, a government may
take action “against dumping where there is . . . a material injury to the
competing domestic industry,” but the government must “show that the
dumping is causing injury or threatening to do so.”96 Just “calculating the
extent of dumping” in the country is not enough to be actionable under
the agreement; a detailed investigation must be conducted to “evaluate
all relevant economic factors that [impact] the state of the industry in
question.”97 Similarly, countervailing duties are only permitted under WTO
rules if the “importing country has conducted [a] detailed investigation”
and shown a causal link between the subsidies and the harm alleged.98
Under U.S. law, “the petitioners have to show that . . . U.S. manufacturers
have been harmed as a result of [the] subsidies” and dumping actions.99
Essentially, there must be a direct link between the foreign country’s
action and the domestic harm for causation to exist and for a remedy to
be afforded.
Evidence of harm regarding trade of solar panels between China
and the United States includes an increase in Chinese exports to the
United States, which jumped up 350 percent from 2008 to the end of
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 87.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Anti-Dumping Actions, supra note 81.
97 Id.
98 Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 87.
99 Andrew, supra note 59.
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2010.100 Additionally, Chinese manufacturers secured “48 percent of both
the U.S. and global markets”101 by 2010. “Imports of Chinese silicon solar
PV [panels] in the first eight months of 2011” surpassed all of the exports
in 2010 by 157%.102
On top of the tremendous growth in imports from China, the num-
ber of domestic manufacturers that have declared bankruptcy or are
close to ceasing operation continues to multiply.103 One prominent ex-
ample is Solyndra, a U.S.-based developer of “concentrated PV technol-
ogy that declared bankruptcy” in August of 2011.104 Another company,
SolarWorld Industries America, the face of the USITC and Commerce’s
petitions, is also feeling the pain, having “closed down its manufacturing
facility in . . . California.”105
Just in 2011 alone, the price of silicon solar PV panels dropped
about 50%, a change that coincided perfectly with the flood of inexpen-
sive Chinese silicon solar PV panels.106 Chinese bankers and executives of
solar panel manufacturing companies deny that government loans “were
made at subsidized rates” but “[a] few Chinese companies have [already]
acknowledged receiving . . . government assistance.”107 “Executives at
Hunan Sunzone Optoelectronics, a [Chinese] solar panel manufacturer
located in . . . South-Central China,” stated in 2010 that they were able to
purchase valuable land close to the downtown area “for a third of the city-
wide rate for industrial land.”108 They further stated that “Chinese bankers
offered large loans” at a below market rate, a mere 6% interest, with the
government of the province paying a large portion of the interest.109
F. WTO Dispute Settlement
WTO members “have agreed that if they believe fellow members
are violating trade rules, they will use the multilateral system of settling
disputes instead of taking action unilaterally.”110 “The Uruguay Round
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Andrew, supra note 59.
106 Id.
107 Bradsher & Wald, supra note 66.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes—A Unique Contribution, WORLD TRADE
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agreement . . . made it impossible” for the losing country in a dispute
“to block the adoption of the ruling”; a country now wishing to block a
ruling must “persuade all other WTO members . . . to share its view.”111
Once a case has been decided, the first priority is for the losing country
to bring its policy in accordance with the ruling.112 If the country targeted
by the complaint loses, it has to “follow the recommendations of the panel
report or the appeals report.”113 If for some reason the country fails to act
within a reasonable time, it is then required to “enter negotiations with
the complaining country” to decide on “mutually-acceptable compensa-
tion.”114 If another twenty days have passed with no agreement, “the
complaining side may ask the Dispute Settlement Body” for authority to
impose trade sanctions.115
G. SolarWorld Case: Dumping and Subsidy Allegations
In a recent Section 301 Petition, seven U.S. solar companies
(fronted by SolarWorld Industries) are “claim[ing] that the Chinese gov-
ernment unfairly subsidizes Chinese solar panel manufacturers.”116 They
argue that this subsidization is allowing the Chinese manufacturers to “sell
their products at below-market prices,” and therefore driving American
competitors out of the solar panel market.117 SolarWorld Industries America
Inc. had the support of the seven U.S. companies in its filing of subsidy
and dumping petitions against Chinese solar imports in October of 2011.118
In its petition, SolarWorld asks the U.S. Department of Commerce to “levy
[large] tariffs on solar cells and modules” coming from China.119
The petition asserts that the “Chinese government unfairly sub-
sidizes Chinese solar panel manufacturers by providing land, electricity,
material inputs, and financing below-market rates, as well as direct finan-
cial support and [further] preferential policies.”120 SolarWorld claims that
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited Oct. 27,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/5UUL-N5LD.
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113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Hart, supra note 26.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.; PETITION, supra note 5.
2014] THE GLOBAL COST OF GREEN 155
the government subsidies are specifically created to artificially restrain
Chinese manufacturing costs and effectively “drive foreign competitors
out of the market.”121 Government subsidy programs are not always anti-
competitive, but what the petition argues is that China’s subsidies are not
designed to support an up-and-coming industry, but rather to give China
an unfair advantage.122 SolarWorld claims that the subsidies allow Chinese
companies to sell their products at prices that U.S. companies cannot hope
to match.123 If the Chinese government is actually engaging in the types
of unfair trade practice that the U.S. petition claims, then China may not
be violating not only WTO subsidy rules, but also domestic trade laws in
the United States.
The SolarWorld petition includes “allegations that China is ‘dump-
ing’ in the U.S. market.”124 Chinese analysts maintain that China’s lower
prices on PV panels “are due to . . . China’s comparative advantages in
manufacturing,” paired with its “excess capacity and market induced in-
ventory clearing.”125 The market for solar panel manufacturing slowed
down significantly in 2011, which Chinese firms claim caused an excess
amount of products, forcing manufacturers to sell at very low prices to
clear out inventory.126
These arguments are exactly what Commerce has been investi-
gating. “Commerce investigators [have been] tracing financial and policy
support the Chinese government [gives] to solar manufacturers.”127 On
March 20, 2012, Commerce issued the highly anticipated decision.128 The
Department has imposed countervailing duty tariffs, which will be applied
on three levels.129 “Suntech Power Holdings Co. (‘STP’), [which] is the
world’s largest solar panel maker, was told to pay a 2.9% tariff, and Trina
Solar Ltd. (‘TSL’) will pay 4.73% to make up for the subsidies they re-
ceived from the Chinese government.”130 The solar industry is still awaiting
121 Hart, supra note 26.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Hart, supra note 26.
128 Steve Leone, Update: U.S. Commerce Imposes Tariffs on Chinese Solar Panels,
RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (March 20, 2012), http://www.renewableenergyworld
.com/rea/news/article/2012/03/its-official-us-commerce-imposes-tariffs-on-chinese-solar
-firms, archived at http://perma.cc/R35Z-7NRD.
129 Id.
130 William McQuillen & Eric Martin, U.S. Sets Duties as High as 4.73% on China Solar
Equipment, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-20/u-s
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the second of two tariffs—the anti-dumping duty131 as well as the final
determination of the subsidy investigation.132
“Commerce preliminarily determined that Chinese producers/
exporters have received countervailable subsidies,” which have harmed
the domestic solar industry.133 If Commerce and the USITC “make[] an
affirmative final determination that imports of solar cells from China
materially injure, or threaten material injury, to the domestic industry,”
then Commerce will issue a final countervailing duty (“CVD”) order.134
The determination that subsidies from China have harmed the U.S. solar
industry comes as a result of a detailed investigation by Commerce and
the USITC, in line with the WTO requirements under the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.135 In accordance with the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, the United States chose to launch its own inves-
tigation,136 rather than use the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure, and
may choose to charge a countervailing duty. The United States will jus-
tify imposing these duties on Chinese imports by citing the exponential
increase in imports from China, the numerous bankrupt and struggling
domestic manufacturers, and dropping prices as clear evidence of harm.
IV. IS THE UNITED STATES PLAYING BY THE RULES?
In November of 2011, the Chinese government criticized the de-
mand of the American solar panel industry for sizeable “tariffs on solar
panels shipped to the United States from China.”137 “China accused the
-sets-duties-of-as-much-as-4-73-on-china-solar-gear-imports.html, archived at http://perma
.cc/U37A-XZMM.
131 Leone, supra note 128.
132 SolarWorld: U.S. Solar Industry Awaits Preliminary Ruling on Chinese Subsidies,
SOLARWORLD (May 28, 2014), http://www.solarworld-usa.com/newsroom/news-releases
/news/2014/solar-industry-awaits-prelim-ruling-chinese-subsidies, archived at http://perma
.cc/D9YG-8LMN.
133 Int’l Trade Admin., Fact Sheet: Commerce Preliminarily Finds Countervailable
Subsidization of Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled into
Modules from China, U.S. DEPT. COM., available at http://enforcement.trade.gov/download
/factsheets/factsheet-prc-crystalline-silicon-photovoltaic-prod-cvd-prelim-060314.pdf.
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137 Keith Bradsher, China Charges Protectionism in Call for Solar Panel Tariffs, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2011, at B6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/22/business
/global/china-warns-of-bad-effects-if-us-turns-protectionist.html?_r=0, archived at http://
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[U.S.] solar industry of protectionism that could” actually undermine not
only the global economy but also “international efforts to [fight] global
warming.”138 Officials called the result a “lose-lose situation,” which would
cause “an adverse impact on the bilateral trade interests of the two
countries.”139 Similar to the USW case against China, subsidies referenced
in the latest Section 301 Petition are also trade-distorting domestic subsi-
dies.140 The USW petition claimed that the large subsidies to green tech-
nology help Chinese producers increase production, “seize market share,
drive down prices, and put [international] competitors out of business.”141
As a result of these subsidies, USW claimed that American companies and
firms suffered from their exports being displaced, domestic market share
eroding, prices plummeting, and jobs being lost.142 This prejudice makes
the subsidies actionable at the WTO under Articles 5 and 6 of the Agree-
ment on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.143 Chinese officials point
to Congress’s action as inconsistent with U.S. laws and out of line with
WTO rules.144
A. Fair Trade? GPX International Tire Corp. v. United States
Chinese reports are claiming that the level of bilateral trade has
somewhat increased the number of trade disputes, but the adjustment
of the U.S. trade strategy is what has caused many of the trade issues
with China. Another, and maybe more important, accusation from China
claims that the United States is using “fair trade” as a ruse to bypass
multilateral trade rules.145
In December 2011, a federal court ruled in GPX International Tire
Corp. v. United States that existing U.S. law does not allow American com-
panies to seek relief in the form of duties or tariffs against imported goods
from China, which benefit from subsidies from the Chinese government.146
138 Id.
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140 United Steelworkers, supra note 43.
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142 Id.
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144 See id.
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146 David J. Levine & Raymond Paretzky, New Court Ruling Renders U.S. Anti-Subsidy
Law Inapplicable to China, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.mwe
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This ruling would make it difficult, if not impossible, for Chinese govern-
ment subsidies to be addressed under existing U.S. law. In GPX Int’l Tire,
the court examined the Tariff Act of 1930, which provides for two types of
duties on imports that injure domestic industries:147 first, Congress imposed
anti-dumping duties on goods “sold in the United States at less than . . .
fair value”148 and second, countervailing duties are imposed on goods which
receive “a countervailable subsidy” from a foreign government.149
“U.S. law allows for the imposition of both” types of duties: anti-
dumping duties, “which are imposed on goods . . . sold by exporters at less
than fair value,” and countervailing duties, “which are imposed on goods
benefited from certain kinds of government subsidies,” goods exported
from countries with market economies (non-communist countries; i.e.,
EU members, Australia).150 But, for years, Commerce “refused to apply
[countervailing duty] law to [non-market economy] countries” (i.e., China),
arguing that “subsidies by definition do not exist in economies . . . not con-
trolled by market forces.”151 In 1986, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit upheld Commerce’s approach in Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United
States, but “the agency reversed its position in 2007” under pressure from
American companies and industries.152 That year, Commerce issued a state-
ment that it would “continue to treat China as a [non-market economy] for
purposes of the [anti-dumping] law,” but stated that it would treat China
as a market economy for purposes of countervailing duties.153 Commerce
reasoned that China’s economy actually differed from Soviet-style “econo-
mies at issue in Georgetown Steel,” and the differences made it possible for
the agency “to calculate whether the Chinese government” did in fact sub-
sidize specific goods.154 The Court of International Trade ruled in GPX
Int’l Tire in 2010 that subsidy investigations of non-market economies
are permissible, but not in conjunction with dumping investigations.155
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in GPX Int’l
Tire confirmed the ruling of CIT (but on different grounds) and invoked
147 GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 666 F.3d 732, 734 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
148 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2006).
149 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (2006).
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152 Id.; see also Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1309 (Fed. Cir.
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155 See GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1345 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2010).
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the principle of “legislative ratification,” concluding that Commerce is
barred by statute from applying countervailing duty law to non-market
economy goods.156 The court held that when amending the countervailing
duty law in 1988 and 1994, Congress confirmed earlier interpretations
that countervailing duty law does not apply to non-market economy
countries, such as China.157 GPX Int’l Tire essentially put an end to
Commerce’s application of both types of duties to cases involving China
in its ruling that Commerce may not apply countervailing duty law to
non-market economies.
B. China’s Recent WTO Actions
China consolidated complaints regarding the final Commerce deter-
minations in four different anti-dumping/countervailing duty investigations
(including those involved in the GPX case) into one WTO complaint.158
China appealed decisions related to “anti-dumping duties and countervail-
ing duties imposed by the United States” on four different products from
China (steel pipes, rectangular pipes and tubes, laminated woven sacks,
and certain off road tires).159 “In each of the four . . . investigations, . . .
Commerce treated China as a non-market economy” in order to “calcu-
late[ ] the margins of dumping.”160 In addition, Commerce decided “that
various [state-owned enterprises] (‘SOEs’) that supplied” the goods and
provided loans to the companies were public bodies.161 China claimed that
Commerce’s use of its non-market economy methodology to determine
the value in anti-dumping investigations at the same time as imposing
countervailing duties on the same products was double and inconsistent
with the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.162 China
also argued that Commerce’s “determinations that certain SOEs” were
“ ‘public bodies’ were inconsistent” with the same agreement.163
China chose not to directly appeal any of the determinations of
the U.S. Court of International Trade from the GPX Int’l Tire case in
156 See GPX Int’l Tire Corp., 666 F.3d at 745.
157 Id. at 734.
158 See Appellate Body Report, United States—Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing
Duties on Certain Products from China, ¶ 1, WT/DS379/AB/R (Mar. 11, 2011).
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United States court.164 “The only objection raised regarding the . . . anti-
dumping . . . determinations was that Commerce was double-counting
remedies,” basically “applying duties twice on the same cost or expense.”165
As discussed previously, the CIT “ruled that Commerce could not investi-
gate” both anti-dumping and subsidy allegations at the same time for the
same period, “because applying a non-market economy methodology in
the anti-dumping” portion results in a double remedy.166 The CIT did not
tell Commerce it cannot “conduct subsidy investigations of non-market
economies,” but rather ruled that “Commerce would have to figure” out a
way “to avoid double counting.”167
The Appellate Body decision on March 11 also handed the Chinese
a more impactful victory than the double-counting decision.168 Commerce
has treated “all Chinese state-owned enterprises” automatically “as public
bodies,” which are directed and controlled by the government.169 By operat-
ing under this assumption, Commerce has considered inputs in the manu-
facturing process from SOEs as financial contributions because they came
from the government. To measure the subsidy, “Commerce only had to
show that the price of the input . . . compared to a price from outside China
was less.”170
The Department of Commerce was already undertaking the analy-
sis to determine “whether SOEs provided inputs at prices that would make
them countervailable,” but “[t]he Appellate Body decision will require a
more complete analysis every time.”171 Commerce will not be able to assume
government control any longer; instead it will have to collect “evidence that
the provision of the input is not a purely economic or commercial act.”172
The Uruguay Round Agreements had already “recognized that [SOEs]
could be commercial” and therefore must “be treated without assump-
tions about state direction or control.”173 The Appellate Body adjusted
164 Elliot J. Feldman, Unless It’s All Politics, China and the United States Should Tone
It Down, CHINA-U.S. TRADE LAW (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.chinaustradelawblog.com
/2011/04/articles/trade-disputes/wto/unless-its-all-politics-china-and-the-united-states
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Commerce’s course by directing it to recognize and accept that “state-
owned enterprises are legitimate entities in the world trading system.”174
1. Implications
The United States will likely continue to treat SOEs as state con-
trolled (although SOEs exist in the U.S. (e.g., GM, Chrysler)). If the United
States continues to treat SOEs in this manner, it will make subsidy inves-
tigations much simpler, essentially allowing Commerce to assume that
government control in those foreign countries equals excessive govern-
ment funding. This methodology would be in direct violation of the recent
WTO decision. If the United States were to be more accepting of the defi-
nition of an SOE as a non-public body, the report of the WTO Appellate
Body could impact how the global economy is viewed and trade is executed,
but legally the report is limited to trade and subsidy disputes only.175
The United States holds that its domestic law supersedes WTO law
and often treats its defeats at the WTO as “applicable to the immediate
case” only.176 The Chinese victory may be short-lived due to its decision
to rely on the WTO rather than appealing the decision directly in United
States court. Additionally, the WTO has a clear institutional weakness, “it
is limited only to prospective and indirect enforcement,” and even then
it only functions “with the cooperation of the parties.”177
C. The New Statute Conflicts with the GPX International Tire
Case Decision
The United States currently has anti-subsidy duties on twenty-
four goods from China and Vietnam,178 but the recent court ruling in GPX
Int’l Tire put those duties in jeopardy. In response to the December ruling,
on March 13, 2012, President Obama signed an amendment to the Tariff
Act of 1930 into law (H.R. 4105), which will allow Commerce to impose
countervailing duties on imports from China and Vietnam.179 H.R. 4105
(112th Congress) supports Commerce’s rationale from 2007 “for finding
subsidies in China,” that “there is enough of a market in China” “to find
174 Id.
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subsidies but not enough to treat China as a market economy” or “find
any sector sufficiently market-based to be treated as ‘market oriented.’ ”180
Previously this rationale may have seemed illogical, but now it has clear
statutory support.
This law guarantees that the current countervailing duty orders
against China and Vietnam remain in effect, while also “overturning
the December 19, 2011 decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.”181 The new law was also worded in a way meant to “overcome ad-
verse World Trade Organization . . . and Court of International Trade . . .
decisions,” which found that U.S. law “did not prevent double counting and
was therefore” unreasonable and inconsistent with the WTO.182 “GPX
Int’l Tire litigation will continue,” as plaintiffs have “raised the consti-
tutionality of the new provision” in their latest appeal, arguing that the
newest statute violates due process.183
D. Possible U.S. Protectionism
Chinese reports argue that through green and technological bar-
riers, anti-dumping, and other non-tariff barriers, the United States is
using “new protectionism aims to bypass established multilateral trade
institutions to protect domestic jobs and repulse threatening competition
from other countries.”184 Protectionist practices are employed typically by
taking advantage of the WTO trade rules claiming to be “free trade,”
which is exactly what China has accused the United States of labeling its
own actions.
The current world multilateral trade system is not without holes,
so countries can find legal grounds for additional protectionist practices.
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An important question that remains is to examine whether the conduct
of the United States is in fact contravening WTO rules and whether the
United States is exercising super-protectionist behavior.
The WTO anti-dumping clauses may actually be employed as a pro-
tectionist tool. According to the Anti-Dumping Agreement as part of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (“GATT 1994”), the decision
whether to impose an anti-dumping duty is to be made by the authorities
of the importing member.185 Because the importing member country makes
the decision, the anti-dumping clauses easily lend countries a legal leg to
stand on to implement protectionist conduct. Commerce is set to decide in
May whether China is “dumping” solar panels into the United States at
prices below their actual cost, in the recent SolarWorld case.186 A product
is considered to be dumped, under the GATT agreement, when it is “intro-
duced into the commerce of another country at less than” its normal value
or if the export “price of the product exported from one country to another
is less than the comparable price.”187 However, there must be a real injury
to the competing domestic industry.188 Although a decision has yet to be
issued, the United States could easily use these WTO provisions to carry
out a protectionist agenda regarding solar panel importation. As previously
explained, imports of Chinese solar panels to the United States have sky-
rocketed, and they are offered at a seemingly much lower price than those
manufactured in America.189 But it could be wrong for Commerce to assess
any anti-dumping tariffs on Chinese solar panels in May, because Chinese
officials argue that “panel prices are even lower in China than in the
U.S.”190 Excluding regional factors such as direct government subsidies,
income taxes, inflation, and investment risk factors, China’s direct manu-
facturing cost benefits for solar PV panels without shipping are only one
to two percent compared to the United States, and with the enormous
cost of shipping, China may actually suffer a 5% cost disadvantage.191
There is really no argument that manufacturers of solar panels in
the United States have suffered recently, but causal links between China’s
185 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M.
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prices and the harm to American industries must be real and material for
anti-dumping duties to be permitted under U.S. and WTO law.192 As pre-
viously stated, Chinese officials argue that the lower prices on PV panels
are due to comparative manufacturing advantages as well as an excess
capacity.193 With the governmental encouragement to enter renewable
energy, many companies have jumped into manufacturing and may have
flooded the market with inventory. If this is the case, as Chinese analysts
claim, then anti-dumping duties against China may not be proper.
Additionally, the United States may be employing protectionist and
actually illegal practices in its decision to impose countervailing tariffs on
Chinese imports in the SolarWorld case.194 This argument mostly depends
on the outcome of the GPX Int’l Tire case. If the final decision in that case
is that the new statute allowing countervailing duties against non-market
economies is unconstitutional, then the already-imposed countervailing
tariffs on China would clearly be against the law. Commerce stated that
it planned to continue treating China as a non-market economy for pur-
poses of anti-dumping laws, so it is incongruent to treat China as a non-
market economy simply to allow countervailing duties to be imposed. If
China is truly a non-market economy, and the law is found unconstitu-
tional, then the countervailing duties already imposed in the SolarWorld
case are illegal. “Notably, the Federal Circuit stated in its original decision
in the GPX Int’l Tire case that the only legal way to permit Commerce to
apply the [countervailing duty] law to [a non-market economy] was to
change the statute.”195
When Commerce did change its policy in the mid-2000s to impose
countervailing duties on non-market economies, “China contested the policy
change both at the [WTO] and through the U.S. court system.”196 “At the
WTO, [China] won a decision that the [U.S.] was ‘double counting’ many
Chinese subsidies when it applied both countervailing and antidumping
duties on the same good.”197 As mentioned above, the new statute allowing
countervailing duties was worded in a way intended to overcome the ad-
verse WTO and CIT trade decisions, which found the practice of assess-
ing both countervailing duties and anti-dumping duties to offset the
192 GATT, supra note 185, art. VI(A)(1).
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same unfair trade practice objectionable.198 “The United States ha[d] until
April 25, 2012 to implement the decision in the WTO dispute brought by
China.”199 Unless a change is made regarding U.S. trade laws, it is likely
that China will continue to litigate the Department of Commerce’s deci-
sions at the WTO, as it has done in the past. China may even bring new
countervailing duty cases against American products, which China has
done in the past to retaliate against U.S. trade actions. If Commerce de-
cides to impose anti-dumping duties in addition to the countervailing duties
already announced in March 2012 for solar PV panels, the United States
would be assessing both countervailing duties and anti-dumping on the
same trade practice, which is exactly what the WTO and CIT found un-
acceptable. China will have every right to bring a case before the WTO,
as this would not be consistent with the Appellate Body’s decision in the
previous WTO dispute.
V. POTENTIAL LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
A. Legal Implications of H.R. 4105
It appears that the new legislation, in fact, does not comply with
WTO obligations. H.R. 4105 instructs Commerce, when finding dumping
and subsidies, to “reduce the antidumping duty by the amount of the in-
crease in the weighted average dumping margin estimated by the admin-
istering authority. . . .” (i.e., Department of Commerce).200 Commerce must
“reasonably estimate the extent to which the countervailable subsidy, . . .
in combination with the use of normal value [from the antidumping cal-
culation], has increased the weighted average dumping margin for the
class or kind of merchandise.”201 So if Commerce is unable to make that
estimate, it cannot make the adjustment, but according to the statute, it
must still calculate countervailing duties.202
The House Ways and Means Committee Chairman, Dave Camp,
voiced concerns that the statute would violate WTO obligations announced
in the March 2011 Appellate Body decision, which warned against double-
counting.203 “The United States Court of International Trade . . . struck
down subsidy finding[s] of [Commerce] on GPX tires twice before” and
198 Palmer, U.S. Lawmakers, supra note 196.
199 Rickard Palmer, supra note 181.
200 H.R. 4105, 112th Cong. § 2(f)(1) (2012).
201 Id. § 2(f)(1)(C).
202 See id.
203 See Palmer, U.S. Lawmakers, supra note 196.
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explicitly recognized that countervailing duty and anti-dumping cases
could potentially “lead to a double-counting that unlawfully would exagger-
ate remedies.”204 The CIT held that Commerce may not assess both at the
same time without employing “a methodology to solve the double-counting
problem.”205 The Court of Appeals in the GPX case did not even address
the double-counting problem, so it seems that nothing has been done to
address the problem. Although the CIT had ordered Commerce to find a
solution to the double-counting problem before finding subsidies, H.R. 4105
orders Commerce to do just the opposite—find subsidies and then figure out
a solution.206 Commerce is essentially instructed to double-count, with com-
panies in non-market economies left to contest the illegal double-counting
on a case-by-case basis.
Even worse, the law contains a provision which allows it to apply
to all proceedings initiated “on or after November 20, 2006.”207 Commerce
must take a second look at all countervailing duty petitions filed against
China since November 2006 and assess subsidies without considering
double-counting or the decisions of the CIT and the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners from 2006 to the present then gain a substantial benefit, which
did not exist when they originally filed their petitions. Herein lies the
problem; typically legislation may be general or prospective, not retro-
spective, as retrospective statutes may violate the due process clause.
Retrospective legislation must still meet the test of due process: a legiti-
mate legislative purpose furthered by rational means.208 In line with this,
the Supreme Court has recognized that although there are serious objec-
tions to retroactivity, not all retroactive statutes are unconstitutional,
but rather only those that, after a balancing of the considerations on both
sides, are unreasonable.209 On March 5, 2012, the U.S. Department of
Justice filed a petition asking all nine judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit to rehear en banc the original decision in GPX
Int’l Tire.210 Court-ordered briefs were filed on March 23, 2012 and raised
the question of whether the statute’s retroactive nature violated due
204 Feldman, supra note 180.
205 Id.
206 See H.R. 4105 112th Cong. (2012).
207 Id. § 1(b)(1).
208 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp v. R.A. Gray & Co.,
467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984).
209 See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 315–16 (1945).
210 Congress Acts to Reverse Court Ruling Barring Application of U.S. Anti-Subsidy Law to
China, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.mwe.com/Congress-Acts-to
-Reverse-Court-Ruling-Barring-Application-of-US-Anti-Subsidy-Law-to-China-03-07-2012/.
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process.211 If the Court of Appeals vacates its earlier decision, the case
“could be remanded to the lower court (the CIT) for Commerce to recalcu-
late the [countervailing duty] margin based on the new” law.212
If the case gets taken up by the Supreme Court, one possible out-
come could be that the law is found to be unconstitutional as violating due
process. Another possibility is that the Court will rule that only the retro-
active provision is unconstitutional. However, if the law is struck down,
Commerce will not be able to assess both countervailing duties and anti-
dumping duties on non-market economy products, especially those from
China. The agency will be limited to the decision in the GPX Tire case. The
most controversial part of the legislation is the effective date of its reversal
of the GPX Int’l Tire decision, which applies retroactively to all proceedings
initiated on or after November 20, 2006.213 Seemingly, the entire purpose
of the effective date is to maintain the two dozen CVD orders Commerce
has initiated in the last few years, each of which would be invalid unless
the GPX decision is overturned by legislation or by an appeal.214 The Court
may hold that the retroactive aspect of the law (applying it back to 2006)
violates due process in the sense that foreign entities involved in these
previous investigations will have no notice and no involvement in the
investigation or decision, and duties may be applied to products where it
was previously not allowed by law (non-market economies).
To determine whether retroactive legislation is permissible, the
Court must look to whether there is a legitimate legislative purpose fur-
thered by rational means.215 This legislation’s main purpose appears to
be an effort to maintain the twenty-four existing countervailing duty
orders against non-market economy imports (“23 on Chinese products,
1 on Vietnamese plastic bags”216). But the statute is also worded in a way
meant to overcome the issues presented by the WTO and CIT regarding
double-counting. If the Court finds that these two purposes reflect
legitimate governmental purposes and are rationally related to achieving
those purposes, the law may be held constitutional and allowed to exist.
A more difficult argument against H.R. 4105 would involve its pur-
ported violation of WTO rules. “Congress approved and implemented the
WTO Agreement and other agreements” from “the Uruguay Round in the
211 Rickard Palmer, supra note 181.
212 Id.
213 Feldman, supra note 180.
214 Rickard Palmer, supra note 181.
215 See General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992).
216 Rickard Palmer, supra note 181.
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Uruguay Round Agreements Act.”217 In ratifying the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act (“URAA”), Congress examined the legal effect of WTO
agreements and dispute settlement results in the United States218 This
act states that “domestic law prevails over conflicting provisions of WTO
agreements”; therefore, “provisions of WTO agreements,” as well as WTO
panel and Appellate Body reports which conflict with U.S. federal law, do
not have any domestic legal effect unless Congress or the executive branch
“take[] action to modify or remove the conflicting statute” or regulation.219
Although United States courts have recognized WTO decisions as persua-
sive, they have held that they are “not binding on the United States, gov-
ernment agencies, or the judiciary.”220 This means that it is left to the
executive branch to decide whether and how the United States should
comply with particular WTO proceedings. Section 102(a)(1) of the URAA
states that “[n]o provision of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor
the application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, that
is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect.”221
Additionally, Section 102(a)(2) provides that nothing in the statute will be
“construed . . . to amend or modify any law of the United States . . . or . . .
to limit any authority conferred under any law of the United States . . .
unless specifically provided for in this Act.”222
WTO panel findings at times have been brought to the attention
of federal courts, most often as challenges to agency determinations in
countervailing duty and anti-dumping proceedings. Commerce and USITC
examine adverse WTO and Appellate Body reports and make determina-
tions under Section 129 of the URAA.223 Section 129 determinations are
then reviewable under this statute, with the U.S. Court of International
Trade having exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions.224 The CIT’s decision
“may be appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
whose decisions are then reviewable by the U.S. Supreme Court.”225 This
is exactly the chain of events in the GPX Int’l Tire case.
217 Jeanne J. Grimmett, World Trade Organization (WTO) Decisions and Their Effect in
U.S. Law, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Feb.4, 2011), available at http://digital
commons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1812&context=key_workplace.
218 Id.
219 Id. at i.
220 Id. at 8–9.
221 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 102(a)(1), 108 Stat. 4809, 4815
(1994).
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224 Id. at 8.
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Because Federal Courts have consistently found WTO decisions
to be persuasive, but not binding,226 it is likely that China will have little
traction in arguing that H.R. 4105 is breaking WTO rules. Even if China
is correct in claiming that the new legislation does break WTO rules, U.S.
federal law will reign supreme, especially as President Obama gave his
approval in signing the bill.227
The legal and economic implications of this new legislation could
be monumental. The United States government will undoubtedly con-
tinue to collect money on imports of the non-market economy products
currently from the twenty-four existing orders, which the new legislation
explicitly protects, as long as the law is permitted to remain in effect. But
now, American industries will likely continue to bring new anti-dumping
and countervailing duty petitions against more and more products from
non-market economies, especially as countervailing duties were once pro-
hibited on these products. Numerous parties will commence litigation re-
garding Commerce’s decisions in non-market economy cases where this
new methodology and litigation is employed. Based on its history, China
will likely litigate Commerce’s decision at the WTO, but because of the
lengthy dispute process, it will likely take years to complete.
B. Possible Retaliation by China
On top of the litigation, China may bring additional countervail-
ing duty cases against U.S. products as well. China already retaliated
with its imposition of anti-dumping and countervailing duties on imports
of American automobiles in late 2011.228 Chinese officials have called the
duty on American cars a “ ‘proper and equal’ counterattack to U.S. trade
investigations aimed at China.”229 Chinese officials believe that “[a]n eye
for an eye is a sound way for China to face trade disputes with the United
States under WTO regulations.”230
China’s commerce minister Chen Deming argued that because the
new U.S. trade bill violates WTO rules, his country was not obligated to
follow the mandate.231 Deming stated that China would abide by the rules
226 Id. at 8–9.
227 See id. at 2–3.
228 Li Fangfang & Ding Qingfen, US Auto Imports Face Anti-Dumping Duties, CHINA
DAILY (Dec. 15, 2012), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/us/2011-12/15/content_14268625.htm,
archived at http://perma.cc/8M9B-K9DS.
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of the WTO, but that China has “no obligation to follow domestic laws or
regulations in any specific country that are not in line with the rules of
international organisations.”232 There is a danger that if China refuses
to follow or abide by U.S. laws and decisions, other countries may fall in
line with China and refuse to follow the U.S. trade laws, but that has yet
to be seen.
Although China recently won an important decision in the WTO
involving state-owned enterprises and double-counting, a January 2012
appeal decision involving rare mineral exports delivered a major blow to
China.233 China was directed to decrease its duties and “dismantle its ex-
port quota system.”234 As petitioners to the action, “the U.S. and the [EU]
have threatened to bring” another action in the WTO as follow up if China
does not act according to the orders.235 Opinions from the Chinese govern-
ment and general business commentators seem to come to the same con-
clusion that China has no intent to comply with the terms of the latest
decision.236 This recent WTO decision is in fact bad for both the U.S. and
China, and may actually be an omen of what may happen with current
litigation involving solar cells. If China has no intention of following this
decision, then China will not view itself as bound by any future decision in
the WTO.
C. Dangers of U.S. Actions
The United States cannot continue to expect that China will accept
the kind of international trade treatment that the United States has em-
ployed in the past with other countries.237 The most recent legislation,
paired with the duties imposed on solar panels and cells from China, may
very well stir up a trade war and years of animosity from China. A possible
implication of the backlash against China could be that China may bow
POST (Mar. 8, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://topics.scmp.com/news/china-news-watch/article/US
-trade-bill-breaks-WTO-rules, archived at http://perma.cc/EN96-DQBP.
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out of the judicial processes and give up on the rules. Or even worse,
China may begin thinking of ways to retaliate against the United States
or directly mimic its conduct.
D. Implications in the WTO
The WTO’s decision for China will likely have little effect, as the
United States generally treats every defeat as applicable to the immediate
case only and to no others. The United States may ignore the WTO decision
on double remedies. The WTO has a blaring institutional weakness: it is
limited to prospective and indirect enforcement, and depends entirely on
the cooperation of the parties.238 The competitiveness between China and
the United States could undermine the very institution upon which both
countries, for political, economic, and legal reasons, have decided to rely.239
The result of this WTO litigation is a foreshadowing for what is
likely to happen in the latest solar litigation and trade issues between
China and the United States (and likely the EU). But China is not alone
in its potential choice to ignore the decision; the WTO can determine that
a member has violated the rules and sanction retaliation, and then the
violator can basically ignore the consequences or just put up with them.240
China’s latest losses in the WTO empower the U.S. and other countries to
impose trade-related sanctions against China, but because no actual sanc-
tions have even been enforced, China can assume that no such sanctions
will ever really be enforced.241 China essentially believes that it can afford
to ignore adverse WTO decisions. This type of behavior has the unfortunate
implication of progressively weakening the WTO trade system. Although
the WTO is “rules-based,” its rules are negotiated agreements and it is
member driven, with decisions made by consensus among all member
governments.242 In order for the WTO to function properly, members have
to follow the rules they agreed to enact. If member countries choose to
repeatedly ignore the rules and decisions of the WTO, or behave as if their
rules are above WTO reproach, the system will be continually weakened.
238 See Harris, supra note 233.
239 See Feldman, supra note 237.
240 Although the 1994 Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) strengthened the en-
forcement capabilities of the WTO system, countries still have the option to ignore WTO
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E. Is an EU Investigation Imminent?
SolarWorld is also considering opening a second portion of its
fight against Chinese solar manufacturers in Europe. It appears that the
low-cost Chinese PV modules may have been even more disastrous for
European manufacturers, as evidenced by many plants shutting down
over the past year and thousands of jobs gone.243 The European Union is
expected to join the United States in the fight, backing German solar
panel producers.244 In March 2012, a coalition of German manufacturers
asked Brussels to launch an anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigation
for imports of Chinese PV solar panels.245 “China has sent a delegation
to consult with the EU in an attempt to convince the body that Chinese
companies” have not in fact “been dumping goods in Europe,” but even
the Chinese government recognizes that if an EU investigation is imple-
mented, it would be a hit to Chinese manufacturers.246
VI. POTENTIAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A. Global Implications
India has already “latch[ed] on to the issue and is threatening
to” now “investigate imports from the U.S. and China.”247 Additionally,
Germany has brought an anti-dumping claim, but the impact is likely not
to be experienced for months.248 More importantly, Chinese companies may
receive a heavy blow if final U.S. tariffs and duties turn out to be as high
as SolarWorld requested.249 China’s major solar PV companies have already
begun focusing on coping strategies.250 Additionally, many companies in
243 Karl-Erik Stromsta, SolarWorld May Take Chinese “Unfair Trade” Fight to Europe,
RECHARGE (Nov. 25, 2012), http://www.rechargenews.com/solar/article1295188.ece, archived
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China have already reported excess inventory251 and if these tariffs or du-
ties cause Chinese solar products to be too expensive, smaller companies
may have to shut down. Final decisions on tariffs and duties on Chinese
solar panels are not expected for several years, but based on the current
situation some “solar-power developers have already changed their sup-
ply contracts from [solar] panels made in China to those made” in coun-
tries such as Taiwan and South Korea.252 Even more developers may
change their contracts based on the outcome of the investigations, which
could be potentially very costly for China in the end.253
China’s advantage may not be sustainable in the long run regard-
less of the outcome. Factors such as inflation, growing importance of
shipping costs, reliance on massive government subsidies, and lack of
technological diversification are potential downsides for the Chinese solar
PV industry.
B. Implications in the U.S.
1. U.S. Jobs
The rise of solar energy has created many jobs in the United States,
during this particularly difficult economic situation.254 As of early 2012,
more than 100,000 Americans were employed in the domestic solar energy
industry, and industry employment is expected to grow 24 percent in
2012.255 But some experts worry that the trade issues with China will
weaken this much needed job growth.256 Kevin Lapidus, the senior vice
president of legal and government affairs for MEMC SunEdison recently
expressed that the solution for further progress in the solar industry is to
keep “reduc[ing] the price of solar [PV] cells, modules and panels, . . .
manufacturing and balance of systems costs.”257 Countervailing duties on
Chinese-made silicon PV panels may actually “increase the cost of solar
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PV modules and panels,” meaning that the “overall cost of installing solar
energy systems will increase.”258 With increased prices of the entire sys-
tem, cancellations of many U.S. projects will likely follow, which in turn
would repress job creation.259 Installation jobs make up 52% of the U.S.
solar industry.260 Only 17% of jobs in the U.S. solar industry are in sales
and distribution, and only 24% are in manufacturing, including manufac-
turing of all components of the systems.261 The trade case is attempting to
protect a small percentage of the solar job market, while possibly harm-
ing a large majority of the industry and its employees.
2. Undermining U.S. Public Interest
U.S. trade law does not contain a public interest exception; there-
fore, courts and agencies do not have a direct method for considering the
competing interests of related industries. American solar manufacturers
want the price of solar cells and panels to go up, but the companies install-
ing solar systems prefer the trend in declining prices.262 The lower price is
attractive to installers because their job of selling individuals and compa-
nies full systems and installations is easier as compared to a few years
ago, when the price of a solar system was out of reach for many people.263
In cases such as solar panels, the U.S. trade law appears to be di-
rectly opposing the public interest. On first glance, more affordable solar
power is in the best interest of the public. Currently, however, U.S. trade
law requires that an industry-filed petition showing material injury or
threat of material injury from dumped foreign imports has to result in
duties, raising the price of imports or excluding them from the United
States market altogether. The public interest cannot stand up to the re-
quirement in the current laws to provide a remedy to the injured party
based on their proper petition, so in many cases the public may actually
be harmed by government action to protect domestic industry.
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3. Undermining U.S. Clean Energy Policy
The most recent presidential administration and many U.S. states
have been strong advocates of solar and renewable energy. If the cost of
modules and solar energy go up, the growth of the industry and the via-
bility of solar energy will be damaged. Solar energy has been criticized
for being too expensive, but now costs have steadily dropped and the
latest trade case with China may reverse this trend, making solar energy
once again a point of contention. The drop in solar PV and polysilicon
prices, resulting from increasing Chinese production, has ironically led
governments in countries at the forefront of solar power and technology
growth to cut back and possibly eliminate or hold off on subsidies and
other incentives—as one report put it, “killing the goose that lays the
golden eggs, so to speak.”264
CONCLUSION
While China has made large strides in improving its environmental
and energy laws and policies, there are unfortunate side effects to its quest
for green growth. Some policies and laws are actually harmful to the inter-
national market, the most affected being the United States and European
Union. However, the United States is not without fault. It too has been en-
gaging in murky practices, and possibly even exercises in protectionism.
The most unfortunate result of the growing trade tension revolving around
solar panels and other green technology is that the world could actually
benefit greatly from a more cooperative approach to tackling energy issues.
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